Local authentication hub
by Alexander Bokovoy and Andreas Schneider
FOSDEM 2025 is just behind us and it was a great event as always. Alexander and I had a chance to talk
about the local authentication hub project. Our FOSDEM talk was “localkdc – a general local authentication hub”. You can watch it and come back here for more details.
But before going into details, let us provide a bit of a background. It is 2025 now and we should go almost three decades back (ugh!).
History dive
Authentication on Linux systems is interwoven with the identity of the users. Once a user logged in, a process is running under a certain POSIX account identity. Many applications validate the presence of the account prior to the authentication itself. For example, the OpenSSH server does check the POSIX account and its properties and if the user was not found, will intentionally corrupt the password passed to the PAM authentication stack request. An authentication request will fail but the attempt will be recorded in the system journal.
This joint operation between authentication and identification sources in Linux makes it important to maintain a coherent information state. No wonder that in corporate environments it is often handled centrally: user and group identities stored at a central server and sourced from that one by a local software, such as SSSD. In order to consume these POSIX users and groups, SSSD needs to be registered with the centralized authority or, in other words, enrolled into the domain. Domain enrollment allows not only identity and authentication of users: both the central server and the enrolled client machine can mutually authenticate each other and be sure they talk to the right authority when authenticating the user.
FreeIPA provides a stable mechanism for building a centralized domain management system. Each user account has POSIX attributes associated with it and each user account is represented by the Kerberos principal. Kerberos authentication can be used to transfer the authentication state across multiple services and provides a chance for services to discover user identity information beyond POSIX. It also makes strong linking between the POSIX level identity and authentication structure possible: for example, a Kerberos service may introspect a Kerberos ticket presented by a user’s client application to see how this user was authenticated originally: with a password or some specific passwordless mechanism. Or, perhaps, that a client application performs operations on behalf of the user after claiming it was authenticated using a different (non-Kerberos) authentication.
Local user accounts’ use lacks this experience. Each individual service needs to reauthenticate a user again and again. Local system login: authenticate. Elevating privileges through SUDO? Authenticate again, if not explicitly configured otherwise. Details of the user session state, like how long this particular session is active, is not checked by the applications, making it also harder to limit access. There is no information on how this user was authenticated. Finally, overall user experience between local (standalone) authentication and domain-enrolled one differs, making it harder to adjust and educate users.
Local authentication is also typically password-based. This is not a bad thing in itself but depending on applications and protocols, worse choices could be made, security-wise. For example, contemporary SMB 3.11 protocol is quite secure if authenticated using Kerberos. For non-Kerberos usage, however, it is left to rely on NTLM authentication protocol which requires use of RC4 stream cipher. There are multiple attacks known to break RC4-based encryption, yet it is still used in majority of non-domain joined communications using SMB protocol simply because there was no (so far) alternative. To be correct, there was always an alternative, use of Kerberos protocol, but setting it up for individual isolated systems wasn’t practical.
The Kerberos protocol assumes the use of three different parties: a client, a service, and a key distribution center (KDC). In corporate environments a KDC is part of the domain controller system, a client and a service are both domain members, computers are enrolled in the domain. The client authenticates to KDC and obtains a Kerberos ticket granting ticket (TGT). It then requests a service ticket from the KDC by presenting its TGT and then presents this service ticket to the service. The service application, on its side, is able to decrypt the service ticket presented by the client and authenticate the request.
In the late 2000s Apple realised that for individual computers a number of user accounts is typically small and a KDC can be run as a service on the individual computer itself. When both the client and server are on the same computer, this works beautifully. The only problem is that when a user needs to authenticate to a different computer’s service, the client cannot reach the KDC hosted on the other computer because it is not exposed to the network directly. Luckily, MIT Kerberos folks already thought about this problem a decade prior to that: in 1997 a first idea was published for a Kerberos extension that allowed to tunnel Kerberos requests over a different application protocol. This specification became later known as “Initial and Pass Through Authentication Using Kerberos V5 and the GSS-API” (IAKerb). An initial implementation for MIT Kerberos was done in 2009/2010 while Apple introduced it in 2007 to enable remote access to your own Mac across the internet. It came in MacOS X 10.5 as a “Back to My Mac” feature and even got specified in RFC 6281, only to be retired from MacOS in 2019.
Modern days
In the 2020s Microsoft continued to work on NTLM removal. In 2023 they announced that all Windows systems will have a local KDC as their local authentication source, accessible externally via selected applications through the IAKerb mechanism. By the end of 2024, we have only seen demos published by Microsoft engineers at various events but this is a promising path forward. Presence of the local KDC in Windows raises an interoperability requirement: Linux systems will have to handle access to Windows machines in a standalone environment over SMB protocol. Authentication is currently done with NTLM, it will eventually be removed, thus we need to support the IAKerb protocol extension.
The NTLM removal for Linux systems requires several changes. First, the Samba server will need to learn how to accept authentication with the IAKerb protocol extension. Then, Samba client code needs to be able to establish a client connection and advertise IAKerb protocol extension. For kernel level access, the SMB filesystem driver needs to learn how to use IAKerb as well, this will also need to be implemented in the user space cifs-utils package. Finally, to be able to use the same feature in a pure Linux environment, we need to be able to deploy Kerberos KDC locally and do it in an easy manner on each machine.
This is where we had an idea. If we are going to have a local KDC running on each system, maybe we should use it to handle all authentication and not just for the NTLM removal? This way we can make both the local and domain-enrolled user experience the same and provide access locally to a whole set of authentication methods we support for FreeIPA: passwords, smartcards, one-time passwords and remote RADIUS server authentication, use of FIDO2 tokens, and authentication against an external OAuth2 Identity Provider using a device authorization grant flow.
How “local” a local KDC should be?
On standalone systems it is often not desirable to run daemons continuously. Also, it is not desirable to expose these services to the connected network if they really don’t need to be exposed. A common approach to solve this problem is by providing a local inter-process communication (IPC) mechanism to communicate with the server components. We chose to expose a local KDC via UNIX domain sockets. A UNIX domain socket is a well-known mechanism and has known security properties. With the help of a systemd feature called socket activation, we also can start local KDC on demand, when a Kerberos client connects over the UNIX domain socket. Since on local systems actual authentication requests don’t happen often, this helps to reduce memory and CPU usage in the long run.
If a local KDC is only accessible over a UNIX domain socket, remote applications could not get access to it directly. This means they would need to have help from a server application that can utilize the IAKerb mechanism to pass-through the communication between a client and the KDC. It would enable us to authenticate as a local user remotely from a different machine. Due to how the IAKerb mechanism is designed and integrated into GSS-API, this only allows password-based authentication. Anything that requires passwordless methods cannot obtain initial Kerberos authentication over IAKerb, at least at this point.
Here is a small demo on Fedora, using our localkdc tool to start a local KDC, obtain a Kerberos ticket upon login. The tickets can then be used effortlessly to authenticate to local services such as SUDO or Samba. For remote access we rely on Samba support for IAKerb and authenticate with GSSAPI but local smbclient uses a password first to obtain the initial ticket over IAKerb. This is purely a limitation of the current patches we have to Samba.
Make a pause here and think about the implications. We have an initial Kerberos ticket from the local system. The Kerberos ticket embeds details of how this authentication happened. We might have used a password to authenticate, or a smartcard. Or any other supported pre-authentication methods. We could reuse the same methods FreeIPA already provides in the centralized environment.
The Kerberos ticket also can contain details about the user session, including current group membership. It does not current have that in the local KDC case but we aim to fix that. This ticket can be used to authenticate to any GSS-API or Kerberos-aware service on this machine. If a remote machine accepts Kerberos, it theoretically could accept a ticket presented by a client application running on the local machine as well. Only, to do that it needs to be able to communicate with our local KDC and it couldn’t access it.
Trust management
Luckily, a local KDC deployment is a full-featured Kerberos realm and thus can establish cross-realm agreements with other Kerberos realms. If two “local” KDC realms have trust agreements between each other, they can issue cross-realm Kerberos tickets which applications can present over IAKerb to the remote “local” KDC. Then a Kerberos ticket to a service running on the target system can be requested and issued by the system’s local KDC.
Thus, we can achieve passwordless authentication locally on Linux systems and have the ability to establish peer to peer agreements across multiple systems, to allow authentication requests to flow and operate on commonly agreed credentials. A problem now moves to the management area: how to manage these peer to peer agreements and permissions in an easy way?
Systemd User/Group API support
MIT Kerberos KDC implementation provides a flexible way to handle Kerberos principals’ information. A database backend (KDB) implementation can be dynamically loaded and replaced. This is already used by both FreeIPA and Samba AD to integrate MIT Kerberos KDC with their own database backends based on different LDAP server implementations. For a local KDC use case running a full-featured LDAP server is not required nor intended. However, it would be great if different applications could expose parts of the data needed by the KDB interfaces and cooperate together. Then a single KDB driver implementation could be used to streamline and provide uniform implementation of Kerberos-specific details in a local KDC.
One of the promising interfaces to achieve that is the User/Group record lookup API via varlink from systemd. Varlink allows applications to register themselves and listen on UNIX domain sockets for communication similar to D-Bus but with much less implementation overhead. The User/Group API technically also allows to merge data coming from different sources when an application inquires the information. “Technically”, because io.systemd.Multiplexer API endpoint currently does not support merging non-overlapping data representing the same account from multiple sources. Once it would become possible, we could combine the data dynamically and may interact with users on demand when corresponding requsts come in. Or we can implement our own blending service.
Blending data requests from multiple sources within MIT KDC needs a specialized KDB driver. We certainly don’t want this driver to duplicate the code from other drivers, so making these drivers stackable would be a good option. Support for one level of stacking has been merged to MIT Kerberos through a quickly processed pull request and will be available in the next MIT Kerberos release. This allows us to have a single KDB driver that loads other drivers specialized in storing Kerberos principals and processing additional information like MS-PAC structure or applying additional authorization details.
Establishing trusts
If Alice and Bob are in the same network and want to exchange some files, they could do this using SMB and Samba. But that Alice can authenticate on Bob’s machine, they would need to establish a Kerberos cross realm trust. With the current tooling this is a complex task. For users we need to make this more accessible. We want to allow users to request trust on demand and validate these requests interactively. We also want to allow trust to be present for a limited timeframe, automatically expiring or manually removed.
If we have a Kerberos principal lookup on demand through a curated varlink API endpoint, we also can have a user-facing service to initiate establishing the trust between two machines on demand. Imagine a user trying to access SMB share on one desktop system that triggers a pop-up to establish trust relationship with a corresponding local KDC on the remote desktop system. Both owners of the systems would be able to communicate out of band that provided information is correct and can be trusted. Once it is done, we can return back the details of the specific Kerberos principal that represents this trust relationship. We can limit lifetime of this agreement so that it would disappear automatically in one hour or a day, or a week.
Current state of local authentication hub
We started with two individual implementation paths early in 2024:
- Support IAKerb in MIT Kerberos and Samba
- Enable MIT Kerberos to be used locally without network exposure
MIT Kerberos did have support for IAKerb protocol extension for more than a decade but since Microsoft introduced some changes to the protocol, those changes needed to be integrated as well. This was completed during summer 2024, though no upstream release is available yet. MIT Kerberos typically releases new versions yearly in January so we hope to get some updates early 2025.
Samba integration with IAKerb is currently under implementation. Originally, Microsoft was planning to release Windows 11 and Windows Server 2025 with IAKerb support enabled during autumn 2024. However, the Windows engineering team faced some issues and IAKerb is still not enabled in the Windows Server 2025 and Windows 11 releases. We are looking forward to getting access to Windows builds that enable IAKerb support to ensure interoperability before merging Samba changes upstream. We also need to complete the Samba implementation to properly support locally-issued Kerberos tickets and not only do acquisition of the ticket based on the password.
Meanwhile, our cooperation with MIT Kerberos development team led to advancements in the local KDC support. The MIT Kerberos KDC can now be run over a UNIX domain socket. Also on systemd-enabled systems we allow socket activation, transforming local KDC into an on-demand service. We will continue our work on a dynamic database for a local KDC, to allow on-demand combination of resources from multiple authoritative local sources (Samba, FreeIPA, SSSD, local KDC, future dynamic trust application).
For experiments and ease of deployments, a new configuration tool was developed, localkdc. The tool is available at localkdc and COPR repository can be used to try the whole solution on Fedora.
If you want to get that test tried in a simple setup, you might be interested in a tool that we developed initially for FreeIPA: FreeIPA local tests. This tool allows to provision and run a complex test environment in podman containers. The video of the local KDC usage was actually generated automatically by the scripts from here.